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INTRODUCTION
Dean Martha Minow’s wide-ranging and learned Jorde lecture
Forgiveness, Law, and Justice is characteristic in its unstinting ambition. 1 The
lecture does not merely sweep in complex normative and empirical questions
concerning the relationship of legal institutions and rules to a capaciously
defined concept of “forgiveness.” It further reaches beyond the sublunary
scholarly task of delimiting and describing. Unconfined to the desiccated
philological minutia of a Casaubon, 2 Dean Minow instead approaches her topic
with dauntless optimism and eyes fixed firmly on empyrean-minded aspiration.
To follow her argument is to be apprised of the possibility of a stronger loving
world and to have one’s own parochial and reflexive skepticism—the coin of
the realm in the law school workshop—put to shame.
Yet to speak in aspirational terms should not mean dispensing with the
questions of how to attain a given vision of justice or to diagnose with
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1. Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1615 (2015).
2. Not all philologists are as narrow-minded or intellectually impoverished as Dorothea
Brooke’s unfortunate elect. See, e.g., JAMES C. TURNER, PHILOLOGY: THE FORGOTTEN ORIGINS OF
THE MODERN HUMANITIES (2014).
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precision the barriers to its realization. 3 Hence, while I share Dean Minow’s
large ambition for law as a catalyst for interpersonal and social reforms, my
Essay here will focus narrowly on the impediments to that ambition. My goal
here is modest along several dimensions. To begin with, it is narrow in
conceptual and geographical terms. Although Dean Minow anchors her topic
with a parsimonious definition of forgiveness as “a conscious, deliberate
decision to forgo rightful grounds for grievance against those who have
committed a wrong or harm,” 4 her discussion overflows that definition to touch
on several related, but nonetheless distinct, normatively infused concepts. In
the course of her exegesis, moreover, she ranges through geographically
disparate examples that include transitional justice mechanisms in South
Africa, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the
International Criminal Court; the treatment of former child soldiers; and the
discharge of sovereign debt obligations under the so-called “odious debt”
doctrine. 5
Eschewing that conceptual and geographic breadth, I will focus on only
one of the concepts that Dean Minow’s seriatim conjures, and circumscribe my
reach to the vulgar demotic of American law. More specifically, this Essay
concentrates upon our domestic experience with what Dean Minow’s colleague
Professor Carol Steiker terms “legal institutions of mercy,” 6 institutions that
have either wholesale or retail power to mitigate civil or criminal liability. It
examines the conditions under which democratic institutions can exercise some
form of mercy. The simple claim of this Essay is that our own rich experience
under the U.S. Constitution suggests it is extraordinarily difficult to
institutionalize such official forbearance—especially on democratic soil—and
especially when our political economy, in its superfluously punitive modalities,
generates the need for mercy. The American experience points toward factors
suggestive of a causal link between the democratic pedigree of institutions and
resistance to the legal instantiation of mercy. Rather than seeking redemptive
reforms through democratic process, I suggest, the institutional installation of
merciful discretion often requires a dispensation from, and limits to, the
otherwise democratic order.

3. Even the prophetic voices most admired today had specific and nuanced diagnoses of the
social pathologies they confronted, not merely diaphanous hopes of a better world. See, e.g., Tommie
Shelby, Justice & Racial Conciliation: Two Visions, DAEDALUS, Winter 2011, at 95, 96–99
(describing Martin Luther King Jr.’s precise and unsparing understanding of the “racial realities of his
day”).
4. Minow, supra note 1, at 1618.
5. Id. at 1620–43.
6. Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of Criminal
Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 16, 21 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds.,
2007). Professor Steiker’s ambition in this chapter is different from mine: she is focused on
reconciling the use of mercy with different theories of punishment, while I am concerned with its
political economy.
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My response proceeds in three steps. I begin by offering some analytic
clarification by disentangling three distinct concepts at work across Dean
Minow’s examples—forgiveness, mercy, and excuse—and by showing how the
law can play different functions depending on which of these normative
concepts is at stake. I next explain why a domestic focus, as opposed to the
international lens that Dean Minow employs, may reap dividends for her
project. The third—and most substantial—element of the Essay examines the
operation of mercy in the domestic domain with an eye to understanding why
its dispensation is so impoverished. I conclude by pointing to the nettlesome
trade-offs, most importantly between democracy and mercy, that Dean
Minow’s proposals invite—trade-offs that, in my view, admit of no easy
solution.
I.
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND EXCUSE
Distinct, yet easily confused, concepts are at play across the examples that
Dean Minow assembles. 7 All concern, on the one hand, some sort of response
to a wrong, and on the other hand, some sort of renunciation or setting aside of
an otherwise lawful or appropriate consequence. Despite this commonality,
they belong to three classes. First, Dean Minow’s examples pick out a concept
of forgiveness that arises in bilateral relations between individuals.
Forgiveness, as illustrated in Dean Minow’s discussion of divorce mediation
and transitional justice, 8 comprises a change in one person’s disposition or
attitude toward another. 9 It involves a psychological change and “needs no
observable action.” 10
Second, Dean Minow invokes a distinctly institutional concept of mercy.
The latter is an official exercise of discretion to mitigate a legal consequence
that is otherwise a person’s lawful fate. 11 Unlike forgiveness, mercy cannot be
a change in dispositions only. It also issues in a consequence, typically some
sort of forbearance from the implementation of an otherwise permissible civil
or criminal penalty. 12 In addition, mercy is often characterized by a measure of
particularity, and hence ex ante unpredictability, in its operation. As my
7. Many previous commentators have noted the frequency with which these concepts are
treated as fungible. See Jeffrie Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 162 (1988) (noting that mercy is often confused with other
virtues like excuse, justification, and forgiveness).
8. Minow, supra note 1, at 1620, 1622–24.
9. On the necessarily interpersonal character of forgiveness, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION 243 (1958) (characterizing forgiveness as “dependent upon others”).
10. Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1440 (2004).
11. Murphy, supra note 7, at 3; see also Markel, supra note 10, at 1436 (“Mercy [is] the
remission of deserved punishment, in part or in whole, to criminal offenders on the basis of
characteristics that evoke compassion or sympathy but that are morally unrelated to the offender’s
competence and ability to choose to engage in criminal conduct.”).
12. H.R.T. Roberts, Mercy, 46 PHIL. 352, 353 (1971).
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colleague and fellow commentator Martha Nussbaum has pointed out on an
earlier occasion, one philosophical tradition of mercy, closely associated with
the philosopher Seneca, “entails regarding each particular case as a complex
narrative of human effort” and then devoting close, empathic attention to the
internal experience of those particulars. 13
The particularity of mercy—its standard-like rather than rule-like
character, to use the legal argot 14—distinguishes it from our third category: the
more rule-like forms of discretion, such as the familiar criminal law doctrines
of excuse or justification. 15 Where mitigating discretion operates in a wholesale
fashion according to crisp rules prescribed ex ante, such as in the treatment of
child soldiers under international criminal law described by Dean Minow, 16
then neither forgiveness nor mercy is at stake. Instead, excuse or another rulelike form of mitigation is in some fashion implicated.
Each of these concepts—forgiveness, mercy, and excuse—is distinct and
freestanding. Each can also be tethered to different functions of law and legal
institutions. Hence, Dean Minow suggests that although the state itself cannot
forgive—at least in the specific sense of adopting a new psychological
dispensation toward a wrongdoing 17—it can create institutional arrangements
that engender opportunities for individuals to forgive. 18 For example, it can
provide a forum for the mending of personal relationships in divorce and tort
disputes. 19 Alternatively, the law can intercede strategically to alter the
relationships among whole social groups such as the different races in postapartheid South Africa. 20 The state’s role here is epistemic: a transitional
justice institution that generates disclosures—or, more likely, articulates

13. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Equity and Mercy, in SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 154, 166–67
(1999).
14. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562
(1992).
15. Cf. Markel, supra note 10, at 1441 (distinguishing mercy from the use of “articulable
standards of desert in relation to culpability and the severity of the offense”).
16. Minow, supra note 1, at 1633–37.
17. Can psychological states, attitudes, or actions be attributed to states? A state does not
possess psychological interiority and as such lacks the capacity to possess a psychological state. At the
same time, it is a commonplace to talk, for example, of the state issuing an apology (implying regret
and remorse) for a past wrong. Moreover, some theories of the delegated authority exercised by the
state’s representatives might encompass the ability to adopt psychological postures toward certain acts
or persons. Because nothing in this Essay rides on whether we can usefully talk of the state as
possessing psychological interiority, I bracket the issue here while acknowledging that it is more
complex than it appears at first blush.
18. Cf. Minow, supra note 1, at 1628–29 (noting the importance of spatial arrangements in
transitional justice institutions that allow for proximity between victims and perpetrators, and thus
enabling forgiveness inducing encounters to occur).
19. Id. at 1620–21.
20. Id. at 1621–25.
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expressly what hitherto has been a “public secret.” 21 This institution thereby
dissolves an impediment to frank and full intergroup recognition and enables
forgiveness and social progress. Finally, the state can itself renounce a civil or
criminal penalty against a liable or culpable person, either by announcing a
general mitigating rule or by vesting an official with exculpatory discretion. 22
Simply put, society moves on as a practical matter without regard to lingering
beliefs and dispositions. In the latter category fall a substantial number of Dean
Minow’s examples, including the operation of some transitional justice
regimes, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the Rome Statute, and
the operation of the odious debt doctrine in relation to sovereign debt. 23 In
short, just as we can disentangle a number of operative concepts in Dean
Minow’s account, so too can we conjure many permutations of law’s function.
I am skeptical I can say anything meaningful about so diverse an array of
psychological and institutional concepts, let alone about the distinct roles that
law and legal institutions might play in service of the different concepts.
Consequently, I will focus on the one category that strikes me as most
interesting, in part because it is likely the one that is most difficult to get off the
ground: the instances in which the law vests relatively unconstrained discretion
in an individual, usually an official, to dispense with an otherwise applicable
civil or criminal penalty—in other words, the operation of “legal institutions of
mercy.” 24 In my account, this term captures those legal institutions that possess
some measure of discretionary authority to mitigate public law penalties. 25
That discretion can be exercised either wholesale (as a rule-like excuse) or
retail (as standard-like mercy). Such institutions have special salience in the
criminal justice context. They also play a role when the state commits a serious
constitutional wrong. Although the defining quality of such institutions is their
authority to execute legally binding acts of mercy, their operation likely often
implicates a psychological act of forgiveness on the part of some specific class
of state officials. In the following discussion, therefore, I refer to both
forgiveness and mercy to capture the elements of Dean Minow’s argument that
are the objects of reflection here.
The reason to focus on a class of predominantly criminal examples is
straightforward: not only is it the hardest case for mitigation, but it is also
arguably where both individual forgiveness and official mercy are most
21. For the concept of a “public secret,” or what is generally known but, for one reason or
another, cannot easily be articulated, see MICHAEL TAUSSIG, DEFACEMENT: PUBLIC SECRECY AND
THE LABOR OF THE NEGATIVE 5–6 (1999).
22. There is also a mixed case in which the state arranges for conditional amnesties from
prosecutions, where the mitigation of penalties depends on positive disclosures by the defendant or
alternatively (in, for example, the case of child soldiers) participation in a program of demobilization
and reintegration.
23. Minow, supra note 1, at 1622–25, 1630–33, 1640–43.
24. Steiker, supra note 6, at 21.
25. I will focus largely on criminal law and constitutional rules. I will not address private law
matters of tort, family law, or contract.
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needful. 26 Criminal liability often involves both the most serious class of
wrongs, ranked by some theorists as more disruptive of social relations than
comparative economic or natural disasters, 27 and the gravest species of
punishment. Assuming that either forgiveness or mercy can ever be a
normatively appropriate response to a criminal wrong, 28 under what sort of
circumstances can democratic institutions coexist with legal institutions of
mercy? And can our democracy dispense with penalties under those
circumstances when a mitigating grace is most warranted?
II.
THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES
To explore these questions, I believe we are better off focusing on our
domestic circumstances rather than the international examples that Dean
Minow considers. To establish the bona fides of this analytic shift, I examine
here two of her examples—the design and operation of transitional justice
institutions and the effects of debt forgiveness—to show that we gain more
traction from attention to municipal experience as opposed to international
experience.
Several of Dean Minow’s examples of forgiveness or mercy in operation,
such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa and
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under the Rome Statute, concern
instances of “transitional justice,” which is “the conception of justice
associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to
confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.” 29 Transitional
justice institutions include both truth commissions akin to the TRC 30 and
26. I elide here the question of “needful on what ground?” Dean Minow’s lecture does not
state whether she is a welfarist or some other sort of consequentialist or whether she rejects
consequentialism altogether. I suspect the latter. Given the tenor of her lecture, she may find
persuasive some of Bernard Williams’s acute critiques of certain relatively parsimonious versions of
utilitarianism as a system that eccentrically treats “utilities and preference schedules” as all there is and
indulges in the “illusion that preferences are already given, that the role of [law] is just to follow them.”
Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 144, 147 (1973) (emphasis in original). I have thus framed
my Essay to avoid the attribution of a utilitarian perspective to Dean Minow.
27. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 33 (W.D. Halls trans.,
Macmillan, Inc. 1984) (“In the penal law of most civilised peoples murder is universally regarded as
the greatest of crimes. Yet an economic crisis, a crash on the stock market, even a bankruptcy, can
disorganise the body social much more seriously than the isolated case of homicide.”); id. at 39
(arguing that “an act is criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the collective
consciousness,” not merely because it has widespread disruptive effects).
28. For an argument that mercy cannot be reconciled with retributivism, see Alwynne Smart,
Mercy, 43 PHIL. 345 (1968).
29. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 69 (2003)
(footnote omitted); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998).
30. See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND
ATROCITY 291–97 (2000) (listing twenty truth commissions established since 1982); KATHRYN

2015]

THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC MERCY

1685

criminal prosecutions of former regime officials. 31 Almost all instances of
transitional justice, however, emerge from different national contexts in
different historical, geopolitical, and socioeconomic moments.
As a threshold matter, it is important to resist the temptation to see
transitional justice as a sui generis problem. Transitional justice is not
analytically distinct from “ordinary” justice, which must also “routinely cope
with policy shifts caused by economic and technological shocks and by
changes in the value judgments of citizens and legal elites.” 32 At the same time,
there may be reason to believe that examination of the delimited class of cases
labeled “transitional” will yield only limited generalizable lessons and that an
analysis of the law’s relationship to forgiveness and mercy gets off the ground
more easily, and with more sure-footed results, by starting in a more mundane
municipal context.
For several reasons, I am uncertain that such international examples can
provide dispositive guidance. First, the number of truth commissions (twentyeight) 33 and international criminal courts (at best no more than ten) 34 is
relatively small. Each example of transitional justice is characterized by
sharply divergent socioeconomic, geopolitical, and historical-institutional
backgrounds. Efforts to understand why forgiveness or mercy works in one
context but seemingly not in others is therefore handicapped by the need to
untangle the distinct effects of legal institutions from a host of other
background dynamics. As Dean Minow candidly concedes, therefore, efforts to
generalize from historical operations of transitional justice confront
considerable identification hurdles. 35
Second, even the case studies upon which Dean Minow focuses yield few
unambiguous lessons. Consider here her analysis of the South African TRC. 36
To reach a judgment about the social value of the TRC—its capacity to knit
together the frayed bonds of social fabric across racial lines—it is worth going
beyond the assessment Dean Minow offers of its direct consequences. It is also
necessary to examine its opportunity costs. The TRC consumed considerable
SIKKINK, THE JUSTICE CASCADE: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS PROSECUTIONS ARE CHANGING WORLD
POLITICS 270 (2011) (counting twenty-eight truth commissions).
31. SIKKINK, supra note 30, at 269 (listing forty-eight countries with “transitional human
rights prosecutions”).
32. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 762, 764 (2004).
33. SIKKINK, supra note 30, at 270.
34. Enumerations seem rare in the literature, although narrative histories count few
institutions. See, e.g., Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or
Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 787–90 (2006) (providing a brief
history of international criminal tribunals’ development).
35. It is perhaps telling that Kathryn Sikkink’s account of the diffusion of transitional justicerelated norms globally identifies domestic prosecutions as playing an important catalytic role in
generating a widespread norm against immunity for grave human rights abuses. See SIKKINK, supra
note 30, at 109–10.
36. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 1, 1622–25.
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human, institutional, and fiscal capital in the early days of the post-apartheid
transition. Even if we focus narrowly on the prospects of restoring a social
fabric frayed or eviscerated by racial discrimination, as Dean Minow appears
to, there is an important question about how alternatively the human and
material resources used for the TRC could have been deployed to build social
capital and cohesion. This question has force because the South African state
today routinely fails to supply the basic public good of security from violent
crime. 37 Vigilantism is rife. Mob violence is routinely directed at real and
perceived sources of disorder, especially immigrants from Mozambique and
other neighboring states. 38 While the wealthy purchase private security, a large
impoverished (and mostly black and colored) majority is left to their own
devices, thus creating a “hegemony of the very same social groups that held
sway under apartheid” at the expense of “the very same groups cast out by the
logic of white supremacy.” 39
A recent empirical study of police and state legitimacy in South Africa
that I conducted with colleagues from Oxford University, the London School of
Economics, and the Human Sciences Research Counsel in Durban
demonstrates that state failure in providing public security has led directly to a
substantial drop in the perceived legitimacy of the police and the state. 40
Drawing on a nationally representative sample of 3,183 citizens, that study
found stark racial and economic divisions in judgments of the legitimacy of the
state. 41 In effect, “whites are considerably more likely to feel they have a duty
to obey the police than black [South] Africans,” in part because the latter are
more likely to perceive the police as being ineffectual in dealing with violent
crime. 42 The racially disparate delivery of security from crime as a public good,
in short, has direct effects on the perceived legitimacy of the state. 43 Rather
than uniting citizens, we found that the state’s choices over policing policy
effectively drive an emotional and affective wedge between whites and blacks.
The above analysis suggests not only that post-apartheid criminal justice
institutions have failed their basic mission but that they have failed in a way

37. In 2011, about fifty murders, one hundred rapes, almost four hundred armed burglaries,
and more than five hundred violent assaults were reported every day in South Africa. Kill and Be
Killed, ECONOMIST (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21526932.
38. For acute studies of recent ethnic riots in South Africa, see Aidan Mosselson, ‘There Is No
Difference Between Citizens and Non-citizens Anymore’: Violent Xenophobia, Citizenship and the
Politics of Belonging in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 36 J.S. AFR. STUD. 641 (2010); Jonny Steinberg,
Security and Disappointment: Policing, Freedom and Xenophobia in South Africa, 52 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 345 (2012).
39. Tony Roshan Samara, Order and Security in the City: Producing Race and Policing
Neoliberal Spaces in South Africa, 33 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 637, 651 (2010).
40. Ben Bradford, Aziz Huq, Jonathan Jackson & Benjamin Roberts, What Price Fairness
When Security is at Stake? Police Legitimacy in South Africa, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 246 (2014).
41. Id. at 256–57.
42. Id. at 257.
43. Id. at 257 fig.2 (reporting relationship of police effectiveness and legitimacy).
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that reproduces the stark racial divides that characterized Apartheid society. 44
To the extent that the goal of transitional justice institutions such as the TRC
encompassed the reconstitution of social relations without historically
entrenched subordinating racial hierarchies, it is therefore fair to ask whether
the ensuing allocation of resources was wise. South Africa’s limited pool of
legal expertise and institutional capital may well have been better assigned to
building fair and uncorrupted police and judicial institutions for millions of
black South Africans, rather than to enabling a mere 429 people 45 to confront
their past. To think that transitional justice is the path to social reintegration
and racial harmony is to ignore the quotidian experiences of millions of
ordinary South Africans.
The point here can be generalized: transitional justice institutions are
often established in the wake of particularly severe governance shocks and
coincide with a need for substantial reconstruction, or construction ex nihilo, of
legal institutions. 46 Scarcity of financial resources, not to mention of legal and
human capital, may be far more acute in transitional justice contexts than in the
operation of ordinary criminal justice systems. As a result, the effect of
transitional justice investments on the restorative and affective social values
that Dean Minow emphasizes is not a simple matter. It is rather contingent on
complex predicate questions concerning the alternative uses of resources in
developing effectual justice institutions. Judgments about mercy-related legal
investments raise especially nettlesome questions in delicate moments of
political transition. To offer suggestions about how to employ the law to
promote forgiveness or produce mercy, therefore, a focus on ordinary domestic
institutions of criminal justice may be warranted. Although opportunity costs
also exist in these circumstances, possibilities for observing how different
institutional choices achieve or delay normatively desirable goals are greater.
Lessons in institutional design may also be more generalizable because of
greater regularities in the basic aims and operations of domestic criminal
justice systems as opposed to the high-variance circumstances of transitional
justice.
Dean Minow’s sovereign debt example raises similar concerns. Here, the
problem of not having adequate numerosity to reach judgments with external
validity is especially acute. Beyond the 1923 Tinoco arbitration between Costa

44. The state’s response instead may have done more harm than good to racial equality. See,
e.g., Steinberg, supra note 38, at 353 (noting police reliance in black townships upon “high density,
high visibility, paramilitary policing” to vindicate social order). Evidence of how corrosive state failure
to provide security against crime is to legitimacy is available beyond the South African context. See,
e.g., Justice Tankebe, Self-Help, Policing, and Procedural Justice: Ghanaian Vigilantism and the Rule
of Law, 43 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 245 (2009).
45. Minow, supra note 1, at 1622.
46. For an insightful analysis of transitional institutions recently published in these pages, see
Ozan O. Varol, Temporary Constitutions, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 409 (2014).
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Rica and Great Britain, 47 crisp exemplars of odious debt forgiveness are hard to
discern. 48 Moreover, as Dean Minow candidly recognizes, even if such a
doctrine obtained, its consequences are uncertain. 49 It seems perilous to deploy
what little international experience exists as the ground to build the general
proposition that the legal mitigation of debt can yield valuable social change.
To do so when less fragile ground is available seems unnecessary.
Further, it is unclear whether Dean Minow needs resort to a controversial
and contested doctrine of international law to advance her argument. 50 Price
Fishback, Kenneth Snowden, and Jonathan Rose have recently demonstrated
that the New Deal era Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) programs,
which purchased loans from private lenders and refinanced them on easier
terms, provided substantial benefits to home owners at a time of large
dislocation and economic distress. 51 More recently—and inspired by HOLC’s
experience—Arif Mian and Amir Sufi have argued that a greater willingness to
write down underwater mortgage debt after 2008 would have both reduced the
extent of the recession and blunted its welfare effects. 52 Although defended by
both sets of authors in narrow welfarist terms, debt reduction or possible debt
reduction in both historical eras likely advance the wider set of values Dean
Minow considers salient.
Moreover, American historical experience with debt reduction not only
supports the arc of Dean Minow’s general argument but also yields a useful
cautionary lesson about how debt forgiveness can sometimes exacerbate other
social harms. Although HOLC accomplished its refinancings in relatively
evenhanded ways, the Federal Housing Authority subsequently took up and
deployed HOLC’s classificatory scheme for rating neighborhoods based on
their racial composition to make first-time home purchases cheaper for whites
47. Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts,
56 DUKE L.J. 1201, 1216 (2007).
48. Id. at 1220 (noting that the “concept of odious debts languished in something of a doctrinal
backwater for many years” and describing arguments based on the concept after the second Iraq war);
cf. Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious Debts?, 32 N.C.
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 749, 769 (2007) (concluding that “odious debt is not accepted as a rule of
international law”). Gulati has elsewhere identified “multiple instances of the United States engaging
in and ratifying repudiations of debts contracted by previous regimes.” Sarah Ludington, Mitu Gulati
& Alfred L. Brophy, Applied Legal History: Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious Debts, 11
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 247, 249 (2010).
49. Albert H. Choi & Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2007) (arguing against recognition of the doctrine); see also Minow, supra note
1, at 1641–42 (recognizing such counterarguments).
50. To be sure, Dean Minow briefly touches on domestic experience with debt relief, but her
examples largely concern debt relief campaigns for poverty relief purposes. Minow, supra note 1, at
1643.
51. PRICE FISHBACK, KENNETH SNOWDEN & JONATHAN ROSE, WELL WORTH SAVING: HOW
THE NEW DEAL SAFEGUARDED HOME OWNERSHIP (2013).
52. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 140–41 (2014) (summarizing
expected effects of greater debt reduction during the recent recession).
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than for blacks. 53 More recently, the federal government’s failure to press for
mortgage write-downs in the wake of the 2008 recession must be understood
against the backdrop of a highly racialized targeting of subprime lending and a
consequent pattern of foreclosures and economic distress in which African
Americans and Hispanics fared far worse than whites. 54 The domestic
experience of debt and debt relief, in short, is far richer and far more morally
charged than its international counterpart55 and thus provides much richer loam
for nourishing, and setting bounds to, Dean Minow’s argument.
To think systematically about the potential for legal institutions of mercy,
in conclusion, domestic experience may provide a wider array of examples.
Because these examples occurred in quite different historical conditions, and
under more variegated political and social circumstances than their
international counterparts, they may yield more robust foundations for
inferences about the possibilities of democratic mercy.
III.
MERCY AT HOME
In the balance of this Essay, I turn to the domestic criminal justice context
and ask whether analytic purchase can be obtained there concerning the law’s
capacity for cultivating forgiveness and enacting mercy. That experience is
especially rich because the Constitution encompasses no less than four
institutional sites of merciful discretion. First, federal courts possess
discretionary equitable authority under Articles I and III. 56 Second, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized an almost unbound equitable
discretion on the part of prosecutors to ascertain what criminal charges to bring

53. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED
STATES 196–98, 202–08 (1985) (describing the A through D rating system used by HOLC and its use
by the Federal Housing Authority). The Federal Housing Authority (FHA) insured first-time
mortgages. Without a FHA guarantee, first-time lenders were often unable to obtain credit. Michael H.
Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated
Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1308–11 (1995).
54. Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure
Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 634 (2010) (“[T] he housing boom and the immense profits it generated
frequently came at the expense of poor minorities living in central cities and inner suburbs who were
targeted by specialized mortgage brokers and affiliates of national banks and subjected to
discriminatory lending practices.”); see also Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Impact of the Great
Recession and Beyond: Disparities in Wealth Building by Generation and Race 16–17 (Urban
Institute, Working Paper, 2014), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413102-Impact-of-the-GreatRecession-and-Beyond.pdf (reporting large disparities in wealth loss between black and white
families).
55. The anthropologist David Graeber has persuasively argued that the social institution of
debt reflects “a set of assumptions of what humans are and what they owe one another, that have by
now become so deeply ingrained that we cannot see them.” DAVID GRAEBER, DEBT: THE FIRST 5,000
YEARS 124 (2011).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (the Suspension Clause); id. art. III, § 2 (grant of power to
hear all cases “in Law and Equity”).
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or not to bring. 57 Third, the executive branch has seemingly untrammeled
authority to pardon criminal offenses. 58 And finally, the grand jury requirement
of the Fifth Amendment and the petit jury rule of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution 59 both create instruments that at first blush seem to envisage or
entrench institutional sites of discretionary authority to exercise mercy and to
remit criminal punishment.
The Constitution, then, contains an embarrassment of merciful riches. Yet
a close examination of these four discrete institutional sites of discretionary
authority at work today reveals not one that is, in fact, capable of suttling
mercy or catalyzing forgiveness in a meaningful fashion. Nor is it clear any one
could. Each of these institutions’ powers has been narrowly construed or
hedged around with disabling institutional counterweights. Each consequently
falls short of the redemptive ambitions glimpsed by Dean Minow. The reason
for this, I will argue, roots back to the democratic pedigree of legal authority in
the United States and the tendency of political economies that provide
occasions for mercy to simultaneously stifle the instruments of mercy.
To pursue this argument, I focus primarily on American experience with
equitable judicial discretion and with prosecutorial discretion, the two sites of
merciful discretion that have proved responsive to democratic pressures in
interesting ways despite their notional separation from democratic politics. Yet
it is worth pausing briefly before turning to these institutions and noting the
current state of presidential pardons and juries as means of implementing
merciful mitigation. In brief, the current state of presidential pardons and juries
is penurious and threadbare in the extreme. The presidential pardon has
dwindled to a shadow of its former self. 60 The grand jury, while formally a
check on prosecutors, is largely ineffectual, 61 except as a means of muffling
and deflecting responsibility for controversial charging decisions. 62 The petit
57. For recognition of the broad scope of prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465–70 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; see also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–11 (1925)
(emphasizing the scope of the pardon power); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866)
(same).
59. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
60. By the end of 2014, President Barack Obama had granted 52 pardons in comparison to
Richard Nixon’s 863, Harry Truman’s 1913, and William McKinley’s 291. Clemency Statistics, U.S.
DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last updated July 10, 2015). Even these
statistics understate the expected role of the pardon power, which was used with much greater
frequency in the early Republic to make “exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt.” George Lardner Jr.,
& Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in
Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 FED. SENT’G. REP. 1, 1 (2004).
61. For a devastating critique of the current operation of grand juries, see Andrew D. Leipold,
Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 323 (1995)
(“In almost all cases, a criminal defendant would be just as well off without the grand jury as he is
with it.”).
62. Cf. Benjamin Weiser, Mixed Motives Seen in Prosecutor’s Decision to Release Grand
Jury Materials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2014, at A16 (commenting that the St. Louis County
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jury is a vestigial remnant of our adversarial system of criminal justice, now
long superseded by a plea bargaining process wholly within the prosecutor’s
control. 63 Even in those instances in which a jury trial occurs, 64 the scope of
discretion enjoyed by ordinary citizens against the state is limited. 65 Whereas
their Founding era analogs would have enjoyed a plenary “right and power to
consider legal as well as factual issues,” 66 today jurors who claim authority to
resist the court’s direction on matters of law would be met at best with
reprimands and at worst with criminal sanctions. 67
Even if pardons and jurors play no meaningful mitigation function today,
their respective desuetudes are nevertheless illustrative of two slightly different
ways in which legal institutions of mercy are extinguished. Whereas the
presidential pardon has been abandoned under political pressure and without
institutional change, 68 the role of the jury has been hedged in by institutional
changes, such as the rise of plea bargaining, and legal reform, such as the
rejection of jury discretion over matters of law and the criminalization of jury
nullification demands. 69 The decline of these legal institutions of mercy
evinces on the one hand a tension between mercy and democracy and on the
other hand a tendency for professionalized institutions that are systemic repeat
players—here, prosecutors and judges—to crowd out institutions drawn by
sortation from a larger democratic pool. Mercy is vulnerable to both democratic
and technocratic pressure.
In contrast to the null results an analysis of juries and pardons yields, the
trajectory of equitable judicial discretion and prosecutorial discretion is rather
more complex. In sketching brief accounts of how both fail to further Dean

prosecutor’s releasing grand jury materials in the Michael Brown case might be a disguise of his real
motive—to ensure that no indictment would occur).
63. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2471–76 (2004) (describing prosecutors’ incentives to obtain pleas).
64. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 22 (2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf
(noting that 89 percent of criminal defendants plead guilty).
65. Indeed, we have all but lost the sense of the jury as a site of political participation akin to
the ballot box, as richly explored in Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin
to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
66. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 238 (2005).
67. See Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullification Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the
Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 492–94 (1998) (collecting examples where nullifying jurors were
excluded or punished).
68. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348–49 (2008) (summarizing data on this point).
69. For these developments, see King, supra note 67, at 492–94; T. Ward Frampton, Note,
The Uneven Bulwark: How (and Why) Criminal Jury Trial Rates Vary by State, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
183, 189–98 (2012) (excellent student note in these pages charting the decline of jury trials in favor of
plea bargaining at the state level); Andrew J. Parmenter, Note, Nullifying the Jury: “The Judicial
Oligarchy” Declares War on Jury Nullification, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 402–10 (2007) (cataloging
efforts by U.S. judges to prevent and delegitimize jury nullification).
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Minow’s ambitions, I necessarily simplify, offering snapshots rather than
comprehensive accounts of complex institutional phenomena.
We can usefully begin with what upon first impression might seem the
more promising locus of merciful discretion—the equitable discretion of the
federal courts. Two textual elements of the Constitution warrant the conclusion
that federal courts possess a measure of discretionary equitable authority:
Article III’s reference to “equity” 70 jurisdiction originating in the English Court
of Chancery 71 and Article I’s Suspension Clause, 72 which references by
implication the traditionally equitable remedy of habeas corpus. 73 Although the
systems of law and equity have been merged for almost eighty years now, 74 it
remains the case that courts must often exercise a “flexible and
comprehensive” 75 species of discretion in determining the scope of public law
remedies, including but not limited to habeas corpus. To understand the
possibility of the federal courts as “legal institutions of mercy,” therefore, we
can usefully examine the manner in which judges have exercised their
discretion to calibrate not just the equitable remedy of habeas but more
generally the suite of public law remedies used to maintain the state within
constitutional bounds. 76
Beginning with habeas, an analysis of judicial discretion in the design of
public law remedies reveals that courts have not exercised their equitable
70. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
71. On the origins of the Chancery Court, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 97–99 (4th ed. 2002); see also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond
Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 327 (1999) (identifying “the English Court of Chancery” as the source “from
which the First Congress borrowed in conferring equitable powers on the federal courts”).
72. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
73. See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 503 U.S. 653, 654 (1992) (noting that a “habeas petition”
is “an equitable remedy”); Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (same). As a historical
matter, the habeas remedy “was equitable in everything but name.” PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS
CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 87 (2010).
74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 Advisory Committee’s Notes 2007 Amendment (recording the
Committee’s decision to remove the words “at law or in equity” from Rule 1 in the 2007 Amendment
because the words became redundant with the merger of law and equity); Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2012) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat.
1064).
75. Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 202, 218 (1868); see also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321
U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
76. I bracket here the separate question of how federal judges give substantive content to the
Constitution. At least formally, judges do not claim to make discretionary decisions when they give
substantive content to elements of the Constitution. If judged on the surface of their opinions, judges
behave as if their decisions as to constitutional interpretation were wholly constrained. This means that
judges’ interpretation of constitutional text is not an example of discretionary judicial behavior. Of
course, judges’ claims as being shackled when interpreting the Constitution should not be taken at face
value. The Constitution does not prescribe rules for its own interpretation, and the heated debate over
that question reveals ample space for judicial discretion. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of
Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation (Nov. 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/fallon_10.30.14.pdf. Since judges do not concede
that they have discretion as to interpretive method—and indeed go to some length to deny it—it is not
a useful object of analysis here.
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authority in ways to advance Dean Minow’s goals of attaining justice and
restoring the social fabric after serious ruptures. The equitable writ of habeas
corpus, in its pure form, is meant to be a remedy against executive detention. 77
Yet here in its historic heartland, the habeas writ’s operation has been at best
anemic and at worst counterproductive. Perhaps the highest profile site of
detention without ex ante process in recent years has been the Guantánamo
Naval Bay, which stood largely unregulated by the courts until the Supreme
Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush. 78
That intervention in Boumediene, however, cannot be ranked a success. It
came after a majority of detainees had been released. 79 Moreover, the decision
precipitated a sharp and immediate decline in the rate of releases—one that
continues to this day. 80 It is likely that this deceleration in release rate is due
not so much to Boumediene but to the mounting congressional opposition to
detainee releases that emerged only once President Obama took office. 81 From
2009 onward, Congress has attached riders to annual defense authorization
measures, categorically barring the transfer of detainees to the United States 82
and also barring transfers to other countries without an onerous Secretary of
Defense certification. 83 Without any formal suspension of the habeas remedy,
congressional foes of the President have flexed democratic muscles and
dramatically limited the efficacy of the writ.
Worse, the timing of judicial intervention has changed the law of national
security detention in a way deleterious to libertarian goals. My own ongoing
analysis of the government’s own documentation for detainees reveals that by
the time the Court had intervened, a substantial number of the detainees with

77. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus
has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest.” (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 386 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring))).
78. 533 U.S. 723 (2008).
79. Cf. Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 402 (2010)
(reporting trends in releases over time).
80. Id. at 403 (reporting releases by year). In ongoing empirical work, I have examined the
change in the release rate from Guantánamo. That rate dips precipitously after Boumediene and never
recovers.
81. Id. at 418–20 (discussing political incentives of the Obama Administration).
82. This took the form of a prohibition on the expenditure of funds on any facility. See, e.g.,
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. 111-383, § 1034, 124
Stat. 4137, 4353 (Jan. 7, 2011). For a summary of these provisions, see MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA ET
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40139, CLOSING THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER: LEGAL
ISSUES 16–17 (2013), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40139.pdf.
83. The Secretary of Defense would have to certify that actions have been or would be taken
to “substantially mitigate the risk of such individual engaging or reengaging in any terrorist or other
hostile activity that threatens the United States or United States persons or interests,” and that the
transfer affirmatively “is in the national security interest of the United States.” National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, §§1034, 1035(b), 127 Stat. 672, 851–52
(2013).
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the strongest claims to freedom had already been released. 84 This means that
the pool of remaining detainees who could proceed with post-Boumediene
habeas proceedings systematically possessed more indicia of terrorist risk than
the overall Guantánamo detainee population. As a result, the substantive and
evidentiary law of detention that has developed through post-Boumediene
district and circuits courts in the District of Columbia suffers from a selection
effect: it is based on judicial review of a sample of cases that are systematically
riskier than the randomly drawn detainee population. It is not implausible to
think that the underlying jurisprudence will be at least sub rosa animated by the
judges’ gestalt impression of the detainees who parade before them on
habeas. 85 That is, despite the de minimus libertarian effect that Boumediene
had in short time, 86 its long-term effect may be to lower the price of liberty
deprivations.
The inefficacy of habeas is not limited to the national security context. In
the less noticed immigration context, habeas once served an extensive role in
promoting legality at the border. 87 Today, it has been all but abolished by
statute, 88 leaving noncitizens potentially subject to “expedited” forms of
removal that preclude judicial review of most constitutional issues. 89 Nor has
the postconviction variant of the Great Writ better survived the rigors of
democratic attention. Rather, as I have explored at length elsewhere, 90 the
scope and effective power of postconviction habeas review has been winnowed

84. Aziz Z. Huq & Charles Zhang, Identifying the Predicates of Enduring Military Detention
at Guantánamo (June 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
85. Perhaps suggestive of this unease is an aside in a concurring opinion to a denial of habeas
relief by Judge Lawrence Silberman of the D.C. Circuit: “[C]andor obliges me to admit that one
cannot help but be conscious of the infinitely greater downside risk to our country, and its people, of
an order releasing a detainee who is likely to return to terrorism. . . . I doubt any of my colleagues will
vote to grant a petition if he or she believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda
adherent or an active supporter.” Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Silberman, J., concurring).
86. Huq, supra note 79, at 410–11 (discussing the small number of detainees released as a
consequence of habeas’s operation).
87. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 987–1020 (1998) (providing a comprehensive historical account).
88. See Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1975–89 (2000) (describing changes legislated in 1996). The so-called
REAL ID Act of 2004 further narrowed the availability of habeas. See Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005 (REAL ID Act),
Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 101-501, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); see also Gerald L. Neuman, On the
Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (2007)
(explaining jurisdictional scheme and identifying constitutional concerns raised by the REAL ID Act).
89. Neuman, supra note 87, at 968 (providing that judicial review of “expedited removals” is
limited to the questions of whether a petitioner is an alien, whether a removal order exists, and whether
the petitioner can demonstrate permanent residence, refugee, or asylum status); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(e)(2) (2012).
90. Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 531–53 (2014)
(describing and offering a rational reconstruction of the current scheme for postconviction habeas
relief).
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by both legislated changes, in particular the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 91 and the minatory attitude of a Court that sees scant
value in ensuring state courts’ compliance with constitutional rules. 92 As a
consequence of these legislated and judicially wrought changes, a vanishingly
small proportion of habeas petitioners obtain merits review of their claims, let
alone relief, 93 even as application of reticulated gatekeeping rules sucks up
judicial energy, thereby deepening the bench’s disaffection with postconviction
review. 94
Even if the equitable powers of the federal courts are notably absent from
habeas jurisprudence, this absence does not mean that federal judges never
exercise such discretion. To the contrary, to step back and consider not just
habeas but the full range of public law remedies for constitutional violations is
to understand that the Supreme Court does routinely exercise large equitable
discretion of a merciful character in the design of public law remedies. The
object of mercy, however, is not the victim of constitutional harms. To the
extent federal courts today exercise a merciful form of equitable discretion in
public law, it is not to enable social cohesion or to redeem historical injustice.
It is instead to exculpate the wrongs of the state. Dispensation from the
consequences of wrongful actions is to be found in the widening gyre of
absolute and qualified immunity. 95 It is in the deepening shadow of the “good
faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, 96 most recently exemplified by the
Court’s willingness in Heien v. North Carolina 97 to permit a Fourth
Amendment violation to go without remedy because a police officer’s failure
even to know what the law he was enforcing required was “reasonable” if “not
. . . perfect.” 98 Heien’s contrast with the Justices’ unforgiving, even
contemptuous, attitude to citizens’ mistakes of law almost perfectly illustrates

91. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
92. Such problems are endemic. Cf. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas
Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2010).
93. NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS
UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 45 (2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (finding that 58 percent of noncapital habeas
petitions are dismissed on procedural grounds).
94. Democracy, in my view, is not the sole motive force pressing for the narrowing of habeas
relief. The Justices are also aware of the “acute systemic pressures” imposed by postconviction cases
on federal caseloads. Huq, supra note 90, at 590. Institutional self-interest in the teeth of rising
incarceration rates, therefore, also conduces to the doctrinal narrowing of habeas.
95. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982) (discussing and authorizing
qualified immunity); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976) (discussing prosecutorial
immunity).
96. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–28 (2011); Hudson v. Michigan,
547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
97. 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
98. Id.
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the distribution and quality of the Justices’ empathic investments. 99 Equity in
judges’ hands, in sum, exculpates noncompliance with the Constitution and
facilitates state coercion. It provides no platform for forgiveness or exemplar of
mercy.
The second site of constitutional mercy meriting consideration here is the
equitable discretion of the prosecutor not to pursue charges in a criminal case,
an authority that has received a constitutional imprimatur without substantial
limits. 100 That discretion is not merely a function of constitutional rules but
also flows from the shift to determinate sentencing regimes, such as the federal
sentencing guidelines, 101 coupled with a persistent failure to control “fact
bargaining” between prosecutors and defense attorneys out of reach of judicial
oversight. 102 So far as criminal penalties go, therefore, it is more appropriate to
look at prosecutorial behavior than judicial conduct to appreciate the full
measure of available discretionary authority.
Prosecutorial discretion under the current criminal justice dispensation has
elicited divergent assessments. In net, however, it cannot be said to further
Dean Minow’s goals related to mercy or forgiveness. On the one hand, the
sheer breadth of state and federal criminal law, coupled with the inevitable
resource constraints upon a criminal adjudicative system, leads to systematic
“leniency.” 103 In some instances, prosecutorial charging discretion operates as
99. Mistakes of law occur in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination context and are not
given exculpating significance there. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 531–32 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that the petitioner did not invoke Fifth Amendment right to counsel
when he agreed to speak to police but not to give a written statement without a lawyer present); Moran
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424–26 (1986) (finding affirmative police misrepresentations about
availability of defendant’s lawyer did not undermine waiver of Fifth Amendment rights). The Court
has also taken a pitiless view of habeas petitioners’ filing errors, even when those errors are made in
reliance upon a judge’s directions. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209, 213 (2007). It is, to be
sure, possible to imagine justifications for treating officials’ and citizens’ errors asymmetrically. Yet
the repeated character of officials’ encounters with the law, the distribution of educational and other
epistemic resources, and the simple possibility of training—with the concomitant risk of moral hazard
from judicial exculpation of official error—all list against the sort of unilateral mercy that the Court
has evinced.
100. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“In the ordinary case, ‘so long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute,
the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally
rests entirely in his discretion.’” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978))); accord
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (noting that courts are “properly hesitant to examine
the decision whether to prosecute”).
101. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion,
117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1494 (2008) (“The most significant consequence of the Sentencing Reform Act
was the transfer of power over punishment from judges to line prosecutors and the Department that
employs them.”).
102. Fact bargaining has been documented since the inception of the guidelines regime. See,
e.g., Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging
and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 522
(1992).
103. SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1006 (8th ed. 2007)
(“Criminal statutes now commonly permit (or purport to require) draconian punishments that no one
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an offsetting counterbalance to legislative punitiveness. Empirical studies of
the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences in Massachusetts, New
York, Oregon, and New Jersey found that prosecutors “changed their practices
to avoid imposition of mandatory penalties, that the harsher punishments were
imposed in the remaining cases, and that overall there were no effects on
conviction rates.” 104
On the other hand, the rise of prosecutorial discretion since the 1970s
coincided with an unprecedented leap in the incarceration rate. 105 Worse, the
most sophisticated recent study of discretion in the criminal justice context not
only finds substantial racial disparities after controlling for offense conduct but
also concludes that “half” of those disparities “can be explained by the
prosecutor’s initial charging decision—specifically, the decision to bring a
charge carrying a ‘mandatory minimum.’” 106 Similar to courts, chief executives
wielding the pardon pen, grand juries, and petit juries, prosecutors are not a
promising site for mitigating discretion—at least in the absence of resource
constraints that leave them with no choice but to forego indictments.
To be clear, my claim is not that American legal institutions are incapable
of mercy. In January 2003, for example, Illinois Governor George Ryan
pardoned four capital prisoners and commuted the sentences of the remaining
167 individuals on death row. 107 But the Ryan commutation yields a clue as to
why institutional mercy is so rare: Ryan was at the end of his term. He feared
no democratic reprisal. 108 To the contrary, the “antidemocratic” character of his
action was a central theme in the loud criticism his action elicited. 109 In the
American political system, democratic sentiment—directly or indirectly, and to
greater or lesser extents—animates the unforgiving cast of prosecutorial
discretion, the demise of pardons and jury nullification, and the calcification of
judicial equity that I have described. It is only via the direct election of state
prosecutors, the electoral reward that flows to legislators for promising
evermore punitive policies, and the President’s selection of Supreme Court
Justices who will be tough on crime that institutional form could have been
given to the “relentless[ly] punitive spirit [that] has been ascendant in the

expects to be imposed in the typical case,” with the result that “‘[l]eniency’ has therefore become not
merely common but a systemic imperative.”).
104. Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975-2025, 42 CRIME. & JUST. 141, 166 (2013).
105. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 39 (2006) (reporting
data from 1970 to the mid-2000s).
106. Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2013).
107. AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION 1–2
(2005).
108. Id. at 2, 24–28.
109. Id. at 28. But why should Ryan’s action be tarred as “anti-democratic” given his earlier
election? Although it is by no means obvious that lame-duck elected officials should have as much
power as their newly elected analogs, I am aware of only a few formal mechanisms that give effect to
that intuition.
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United States for more than a generation.” 110 Further, it is a paradox of
American popular government that democratic pressure at the aggregate level
has likely contracted local opportunities for democracy via juries. Public
punitiveness, that is, translates into an expansion in criminal liability and harsh,
mandatory sentences. This in turn compels a shift to pervasive plea-bargaining
and crowds out petit juries, while rendering grand juries mere processing mills
for indictments. So the Constitution’s success as a democratic regime causes
our legal institutions of mercy to flicker and falter notwithstanding their
constitutional foundations.
Yet if legal institutions of mercy have been increasingly extinguished
across the American body politic today, it is not for want of compelling need.
Rather, America’s incarceration rate is more than five times greater than that
observed in the next most punitive Western democracy. 111 Its social cost falls
disproportionately on African-American families, widening extant gulfs in
economic equality. 112 Its gains, especially at the upper margin of punitiveness,
are uncertain. 113 The punitive urge thereby satisfied is, perhaps unsurprisingly,
more closely correlated to racial intolerance than fear of crime or a
Durkheimian concern with maintaining social cohesion. 114 This punitive
political economy, moreover, has only strengthened those interest groups that
oppose mercy, while simultaneously sapping the electoral power of geographic
communities that would oppose the expansion of the political economy of
punishment. 115 Reasonable disagreement exists as to whether ongoing debates
about criminal justice will prove an inflection point in the development of
110. TODD R. CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE: THE RISE AND
FAILURE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1, 58–63 (2014) (discussing reasons for increased
public punitiveness).
111. WESTERN, supra note 105, at 14–15.
112. Cf. Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration,
621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 221, 222 (2009).
113. The most recent research on the marginal deterrence effects of mass incarceration reveals
surprisingly little evidence of welfarist justification. Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and
Reoffending, 38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 181–87 (2009). Further, cross-national analyses suggest that
“crime rates have moved in parallel in the English-speaking countries and western Europe since the
1960s,” suggesting that “many of the things that governments have done to reduce crime rates in
recent decades have been epiphenomenal.” Michael Tonry, Why Crime Rates Are Falling Throughout
the Western World, 43 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2–3 (2014).
114. James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’ Punitiveness: A
Test of Three Competing Models, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 99, 102–07, 117 (2010) (testing three
predicates of punitiveness and finding racial animus to have the most predictive power).
115. On the one hand, prison unions and the prison industry have become increasingly powerful
lobbies; on the other hand, legislative appointment rules that assign prison populations to districts with
prisons, rather than districts of original residence, deflate urban communities’ influence at the expense
of rural communities’ power. Marie Gottschalk, Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the
Carceral State, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 235, 243–45 (2008). In a more recent book, Gottschalk
emphasizes these factors but also underscores the political problem that “a safe, healthy, and humane
penal system is generally not considered a credible and desirable public policy goal on its own,” in part
because of a dominant ideological system she labels “neoliberalism.” MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT:
THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 15, 17 (2014).
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American attitudes to punishment. 116 Whatever the path of American criminal
justice, it seems tolerably clear that the positive feedback loops of the
contemporary carceral state’s political economy mean that correcting its errors
or extinguishing its perverse or excessive consequences only becomes more
difficult with time. 117 Just as those democratic institutions responsible for
criminal justice policy in the United States are those most in need of legal
institutions of mercy, therefore, their democratic pedigree means they are least
likely to keep hold of the ones bequeathed to them by the Constitution. 118
IV.
DEMOCRATIC MERCY?
What then might an advocate of legal institutions of mercy—as I take
Dean Minow to be—draw by way of inference from this account of our law’s
indigenous capacity for mercy and other forms of mitigating discretion? I can
conjure two inferences from our own democracy’s entanglements with mercy.
To begin, theorists from St. Anselm119 to Jeffrie Murphy 120 have observed
a tension between the demands of justice and the exercise of mercy. The above
analysis suggests a further tension between the demands of democratic rule and
merciful discretion. As the late Dan Markel eloquently argued, mercy “stands
at odds with the nature of the modern liberal democratic regime under rule of
116. Compare GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT, supra note 115, at 8 (stating that optimism is
“unwarranted”), with CLEAR & FROST, supra note 110, at 159–60 (arguing that “the tide has turned”).
117. The basic logic here was anticipated by MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS 36–67 (1982).
118. The account I offer here stands in tension with one eloquent account of mercy’s demise,
offered by Professor Rachel Barkow. See Barkow, supra note 68, at 1332. In that essay, Barkow
rejects political economy explanations and instead argues that “the rise of the administrative state has
made unchecked discretion an anomaly in the law.” Id. at 1334. Although I do not question the notion
that claims about unchecked discretion play some role in the public discourse concerning mercy, see,
e.g., SARAT, supra note 107, at 27, her sole focus on that role is not wholly persuasive for a range of
reasons. First, Barkow does not account for the frequency and density of discretion that obtains
without much contestation within the administrative state. See Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1107–31 (2009). Second, while Barkow tries to
distinguish the case of prosecutorial discretion on the ground where prosecutors are more
“accountable,” see Barkow, supra note 68, at 1353, this does not explain federal prosecutors, who are
not elected and whose connections to the electorate via the Attorney General may be more or less
loosely articulated. It is therefore not clear that prosecutorial discretion in the prosecution context is as
distinctive as she claims. Finally, attention to the moment in our national political discourse at which
discretion goes from being uncontroversial to divisive—consider here the Ryan commutation or, more
recently, President Obama’s experience with immigration enforcement—suggests that it is less the fact
of discretion but more the manner in which that discretion is used that engenders public hostility.
Hence, in the immigration case, discretion has long characterized immigration enforcement; it became
controversial only when pivotal political actors found it advantageous to make an issue of it. It is not
clear whether any analogous story of issue mobilization can be told about prosecutorial discretion in
the criminal justice context. Barkow’s account, in short, focuses on a value (legality) that matters to
scholars, and assumes without warrant that it matters equally to members of the general public.
119. ST. ANSELM, ST. ANSELM’S PROSLOGION 125, 127, 129 (M.J. Charlesworth trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1965).
120. Murphy, supra note 7, at 168–69.
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law.” 121 The essence of democratic government is representation of the people.
To represent in a democratic register, whether as delegate or trustee, 122 is not to
act on unbounded caprice. It is to be constrained by some view of what the
people want or need. Markel dissolved this problem by pointing to the
democratic character of our merciful institutions. 123 The problem, however, is
more difficult than he made it out to be, not least because it begs what is
colloquially known as the dead hand problem. 124 To the extent democracy
remains our desideratum, the historically entrenched form of constitutionalism
most familiar to Americans can justifiably limit current majorities so long as it
serves some other value. 125 It is not enough to say that a legal institution of
mercy has a constitutional pedigree, therefore, without explaining why it is
justified as an exception to contemporaneous democratic rule.
Second, more modestly but perhaps more importantly, recent American
experience points to a deep functional incompatibility between democracy and
the discretionary provision of merciful dispensation from legal punishments.
There is, I have argued, a negative correlation between the tendency of
democratic political economies to generate a need for merciful discretion and
the capacity of legal institutions of mercy to operate. 126 This countercyclical
quality renders democratic institutions of mercy, to say the least, imperfect
resources. This is not to say that legal institutions of mercy are infeasible. To
the contrary, European experience suggests that “autonomous . . . bureaucracies
that are relatively immune to the vagaries of public opinion” may well be
capable of mercy. 127 To pursue mercy may thus mean to abandon, at least with
respect to certain institutions or certain policy questions, the full spectrum of
democratic control mechanisms available on other occasions. Perhaps
institutional redoubts from democratic pressure can be constructed on
American soil. The historical experience here, I think, does not bode well. 128

121. Markel, supra note 10, at 1456.
122. For the canonical contemporary formulation of this distinction, see HANNA FENICHEL
PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 119–21 (1967).
123. Markel, supra note 10, at 1456–57.
124. Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM.
L. REV. 606, 609 (2008) (“Th[e] dead hand complaint can be broken into three claims: that it is
feasible for the living to depart from arrangements indicated by the Constitution; that our generation
participated in little of the process responsible for the text; and that the Constitution is otherwise
imperfect for our time.”).
125. A constitution’s dead hand can serve contemporary democracy, too—for example, by
supplying an off-the-rack set of institutional frames for elective choice, which then do not have to be
recreated from scratch with each new iteration of democratic choice. Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of
Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2014). Legal institutions of mercy cannot be vindicated in
these pro-democratic terms.
126. See supra Part III.
127. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 13–14 (2003).
128. Cf. Huq, supra note 90, at 590 (arguing that courts have limited constitutional relief out of
institutional self-interest rather than for any principled reason).

2015]

THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEMOCRATIC MERCY

1701

Nevertheless, Dean Minow’s ambitious and powerful words in favor of
forgiveness and mercy at a minimum ought to provide sufficient impetus to try,
and more than enough reason to think the attempt worth making. That I am less
convinced than she is of the utility of international examples, such as the
odious debt doctrine or the diffusion of transitional justice measures between
different nations, does not mean that her general insight lacks force. As she
makes clear, there is much the law and legal institutions can do to repair a
frayed social fabric in the wake of economic, political, or personal loss.
Whether such efforts can proceed without tempering or narrowing the force of
democratic logic, though, remains to be seen.

